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RECENT CASES
right to speak with his attorney before making a decision to take or
refuse to take a chemical test of his blood-alcohol content following
an arrest for an alcohol-related driving offense. 53 Because of the
availability of a statutory basis for deciding Prideaux, the question
of a constitutional right to speak with an attorney was not decided.
None of the states, as yet, have held that a defendant has a con-
stitutional right to speak with an attorney in such a situation.5 4
While the practical exigencies of blood-alcohol dissipation place
significant restraints upon the time in which a test can be executed
with probative results, 55 the flat refusal to allow prior consultation
with an attorney seems arbitrary. The utility of counsel in assuring
a knowing refusal is readily recognizable. 56 Although the implied-
consent advisement does indicate some of the consequences of a re-
fusal,'7 as a matter of fairness the state should not compel individ-
uals to make binding decisions concerning their legal rights in the
enforced absence of counsel.58
NEIL T. GILLUND
INSURANCE-CONTRACT AND POLICY-THE DOCTRINE OF REASONABLE
EXPECTATIONS APPLIED TO VOID A CROP SPRAYING EXCLUSION
Dennis and David Mills brought an action against Walter Small,
Agrichemical Aviation, Inc., and Gene Engel to recover for damages
to their crops caused by aerial crop spraying conducted on Small's
land. A judgment was issued in favor of the Mills brothers. Small
then brought a third party action against St. Paul Fire and Marine
Insurance Company, Small's liability insurance carrier. There were
two insurance policies involved: the first policy was a farmer's com-
prehensive insurance policy which provided coverage for buildings
and personal property owned by Small and personal liability cover-
age up to $200,000; the second policy was an umbrella policy which
53. -Minn.-, , 247 N.W.2d 385, 394 (1976).
54. The United States Supreme Court, in Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971), reoognized
that suspension of an issued drivers license involves state action that adjudicates important
interests of the licensees and that in such cases licenses are not to be taken away without
the procedural due process required by the fourteenth amendment.
55. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-71 (1966).
56. The licensee's choice to submit to or refuse the chemical test certainly Involves
legal implications of some importance to the licensee; loss of driving privileges for six
months and increased possibility of criminal conviction. See Prideaux v. State Dept. of
Public Safety, - Minn.- , - , 247 N.W.2d 385, 388 (1976).
57. See supra note 40, and text accompanying.
58. People v. Ianniello, 21 N.Y.2d 418, 425, 235 N.E.2d 439, 443, 288 N.Y.S.2d 462, 468
(1968).
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expanded the personal liability coverage to $1,000,000.1 The compre-
hensive policy excluded coverage for "property damage arising out
of any substance released or discharged from any aircraft." '2 The
umbrella policy contained a clause which excluded coverage for "li-
ability arising out of the ownership, maintenance, operation or use,
including loading or unloading of any recreational motor vehicle or
aircraft, except recreational motor vehicle or aircraft for which cov-
erage is provided by an underlying policy . . . and then not for
broader coverage than is provided by such insurance.' "' The terms
"recreational motor vehicle" and "aircraft" were defined in a dif-
ferent section of the policy. 4 Small had never read the policy, nor
was he aware of the exclusionary clauses in it. The lower court de-
cided that the two policies were unambiguous, but because it was
reasonable for Small to expect coverage for normal farming oper-
ations when he purchased his policies, and because crop spraying
was a normal farming operation, his reasonable expectations pre-
vailed. Judgment was entered in favor of Small, and St. Paul ap-
pealed.5 In affirming the lower court's holding, the North Dakota
Supreme Court held that the exclusionary clauses were ambiguous,
and that although honoring an insured's reasonable expectations is
not necessarily applicable in cases where there is no ambiguity, it
is appropriate where ambiguity can be found.6 Mills v. Agrichemical
Aviation, Inc., 250 N.W.2d 663 (N.D. 1977).
The Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations was first articulated by
Justice Cardozo in Bird v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co.
7
In this case an explosion on land had caused damage to a canal
boat 1,000 feet away. In determining the scope of coverage of the
1. Mills v. Agrichemical Aviation, Inc., 250 N.W.2d 663, 666, 667 (N.D. 1977).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. The definitions were as follows:
12. Recreational Motor Vehicle: The term "Recreational Motor Vehicle"
means a golf cart or snowmobile or if not subject to motor vehicle registra-
tion, any other land motor vehicle designed for recreational off public roads.
13. Aircraft: The term "Aircraft" wherever used herein, shall mean any
heavier than air or lighter than air aircraft designed to transport persons or
property.
"Top Brass" Policy, Appendix at 5, from Mills v. Agrichemical Aviation, Inc., 250 N.W.2d
663 (N.D. 1977) (slip sheet opinion only).
5. Mills v. Agrichemical Aviation, Inc., 250 N.W.2d 663, 666, 667 (N.D. 1977). The
lower court based much of its opinion on C & J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mutual Insurance
Co., - Iowa- , 227 N.W.2d 169 (1975). That case applied the Doctrine of Implied
Warranty of Fitness as well as'the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations. For that reason,
many writers have severely criticized the opinion. See Note, Reasonable Expectation: The
Insurer's Dilemma, 24 DRAKE L. REV. 853 (1975); 9 AKRON L. REV. 584 (1976); 64 GEO.
L.J. 987 (1976).
6. N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-07-19 (1975) provides as follows: "In cases of uncertainty . . .
the language of a contract should be interpreted most strongly against the party who
caused the uncertainty to exist." N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-07-14 (1975) provides as follows:
"If the terms of a promise are in any respect ambiguous or uncertain, it must be inter-
preted in the sense in which the promisor believed at the time of making it that the
promisee understood it." See Nodak Mut. Ins. Co. v. Loeffler, 225 N.W.2d 290 (N.D.
1974) ; Conlin v. Dakota Fire Ins. Co., 126 N.W.2d 421 (N.D. 1964).
7. 224 N.Y. 47. 120 N.E. 86 (1918).
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marine insurance policy, the court stated as follows: "Our guide is
the reasonable expectations of the ordinary businessman when mak-
ing an ordinary business contract."8
Since Bird, the doctrine has generally been considered an expan-
sion of the Doctrine of Adhesion9 and has been approached from
three different standpoints. Under the first approach, the doctrine is
applied to the interpretation of the specific terms- of the policy.10
This approach in its actual application is little more than a refine-
ment of the well-established rule of construing ambiguities against
the author."
In Golding-Keene Co. v. Quality Phoenix Fire Insurance Co., 1 2
the insured sought coverage for damages to a warehouse caused
by a bulldozer driven by an employee of a temporary contractor of
the insured. The policy extended coverage to include damage caused
by vehicles, but excluded coverage for damage caused by vehicles
operated by employees of the insured while at work. s The court ap-
plied the first approach in honoring the insured's reasonable expec-
tations by stating that in construing the words of an insurance con-
tract, "the test is not what the insurance company intended the words
of the policy to mean, but what a reasonable person in the posi-
tion of the insured would have understood them to mean.' 4 The
court then stated that there was ample evidence to support the con-
clusion that the driver of the bulldozer was not an employee of the
insured, and therefore decided in favor of the insured. 5
The second approach to the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations
emerged in the early 1960's. This approach is based on the premise
that the insured is entitled to all the coverage he might reasonably
expect to be provided under a given policy. Under the second ap-
proach the expectation arises out of the nature of the policy and not
out of any particular wording. 16 Therefore, only an unequivocally
conspicuous, plain, and clear manifestation of the company's intent
to exclude the coverage will defeat that expectation. 7
This second approach was taken in Gray v. Zurich Insurance
Co.,' 8 where the insured was accused of assault and battery and
contended that he had acted in self-defense.19 The liability policy
8. Id. at 51, 120 N.E. at 87.
9. See Young, Lewis & Lee, Insurance Contract Interpretations: Issues and Trends, 625
INS. LJ. 71, 74 (1975).
10. Perlett The Insurance Contract and the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations, 6
FORUM 116, 122 (1971).
11. Young, Lewis & Lee, supra note 9, at 78. But see Maryland Cas. Co. v. Morri-
son, 151 F.2d' 772 (10th Cir. 1945).
12. 96 N.H. 64, 69 A.2d 856 (1949).
13. Id. at -, 69 A.2d at 858.
14. Id.
15. Id. at -, 69 A.2d at 860-61.
16. Perlett, supra note 10, at 122.
17. Id. at 123.
18. 65 Cal. 2d 263. 419 P.2d 168, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1966).
19. Id. at 267, 419 P.2d at 170, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 106.
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contained language which required the insurer to defend the insured
in any suit even if the allegations were false or fraudulent, but other
language in the policy excluded the duty to defend if the insured's
acts were intentional.20 On the basis of the exclusion, the insurer
refused to defend. 21 The court held that the policy was ambiguous
because the relationship of the exclusionary clause to the coverage
provided by the policy was not conspicuous, plain, and clear.22 The
court then concluded that it would be reasonable for the insured
to expect coverage in the face of such an ambiguity, and therefore
those reasonable expectations should govern. 23
A similar situation occurred in Steven v. Fidelity & Casualty
Co. of New York. 24 In this case, the insured purchased air travel
insurance from a vending machine at an airport.2 5 The policy
did not cover alternative air transportation not chartered by a sched-
uled air carrier.2 6 When a portion of the insured's flight was can-
celled on his return trip, he obtained a connection for the remainder
of his trip aboard a small airplane. The insured was killed when
the light plane crashed.
The court found that travel by the substituted light airplane was
reasonable under the circumstances.2 7 Since the exclusion was not
plainly and clearly brought to the insured's attention, the court de-
clared the policy ambiguous 2 and decided against the insurance
company.
Apparently, the distinction between the first and second ap-
proaches to the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations is that under
the first approach the courts have applied the doctrine in determining
what an insured would reasonably expect a particular word or phrase
to mean, while the second approach applies the doctrine to deter-
mine the insured's reasonable expectations of the general coverage
afforded under a given type of policy. It should be noted that both
approaches generally require a finding of ambiguity before they will
be applied. 29
The second approach, as exemplified by Gray and Steven, has
been criticized as straining the issue of ambiguity and perhaps even
20. Id.
21. Id. at 268, 419 P.2d at 170, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 106.
22. Id. at 273, 419 P.2d at 174, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 110..
23. Id. at 274, 419 P.2d at 175, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 111.
24. 58 Cal. 2d 862, 377 P.2d 284, 27 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1963).
25. Id. at 866, 377 P.2d at 286, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 174. The policy could not have been
examined by the insured until it had already been purchased because it was inside the
vending machine. Id.
26. Id. at 866, 867-868, 377 P.2d at 286, 287, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 174, 175.
27. Id. at 869-70. 377 P.2d at 288-89, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 176-77. The court found that In
the type of standardized conduct involved, the insured could reasonably expect coverage
for the entire trip, including reasonable substituted transportation necessitated by an
emergency. Id. at 868-69, 377 P.2d at 288, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 176.
28. Id. (it 872, 377 P.2d at 290, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 178.
29. Young, Lewis & Lee, supra note 9, at 79.
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inventing ambiguity where none exists.3 0 A third approach to the
Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations has been proposed as a real-
istic alternative to a finding of ambiguity where none may actually
exist. Professor Robert Keeton has stated the third approach as fol-
lows: "The objectively reasonable expectations of the applicants and
intended beneficiaries regarding the terms of the insurance contract
will be honored even though a painstaking study of the policy pro-
visions would have negated those expectations." 31 This approach,
which first emerged in the. early 1970's; differs from the first and
second approaches in that it does not require a finding of ambiguity.3 2
The third approach has been articulated in a comparatively small
number of cases.
In C & J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mutual Insurance Co.,3 3 the
insured's theft insurance policy stipulated that in order for a bur-
glary to be covered under the policy, it had to evidenced by "vis-
ible marks made by tools, explosions, electricity, or chemicals or
physical damage to the exterior of the premises at the place of
entry. ' ' . 4 The insured's place of business was burglarized but there
were no marks on the exterior of the premises. The court applied
the third approach to- the Doctrine -of Reasonable Expectations and
found that since the insured had no knowledge of the specific ex-
clusionary language in the policy, his expectations of coverage were
reasonable.3 5 The court also found that the policy definition of bur-
glary unambiguously denied the insurer's liability,36 but to enforce
literally the policy language would render an unconscionable result
and would violate the reasonable expectations of the insured.3 7 The
court, therefore, decided in favor of the insured.38
30. See Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83 HARV.
L. REV. 961, 970-72 (1970), where the author states as follows:
[T]he principle of resolving ambiguities against the draftsman is simply an
inadequate explanation of the results of some cases. The conclusion is ines-
capable that courts have sometimes invented ambiguity where none existed,
then resolving the invented ambiguity contrary to the plainly expressed terms
of the contract document. To extend the principle of resolving ambiguities
against the draftsman in this fictional way not only causes confusion and
uncertainty about the effective scope of judicial regulation of contract terms
but also creates an impression of unprincipled judicial prejudice against in-
surers. If the results in such cases are supportable at Q21, generally it is
because the principle of honoring policyholders' reasonable expectations
applies.
Id. at 972 (footnotes omitted).
31. Id. at 967.
32. Id. at 968. Keeton cites several policy reasons for applying this doctrine even
absent a finding of ambiguity. Those reasons are as follows: policy holders seldom If
ever actually read insurance contracts because of their length and complexity; the poli-
cies can never be fully understood without detailed, in depth study; and furthermore, a
policy holder seldom sees his insurance policy until some time after the. policy has been
made. Id.
33. - Iowa-- , 227 N.W.2d 169 (1975).
34. Id. at -, 227 N.V.2d at 171.
35. Id. at -, , 227 N.W.2d at 172, 177.
36. Id. at , 227 N.W.2d at 173.
37. Id. at - , 227 N.\V.2d at 177, 179.
38. Id. at - , 227 N.W.2d at 181. The court in Bryan Construction v. Employers' Sur-
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It should be noted that this third approach has been criticized
as carrying the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations too far in the
modification of the specific language 'of the written insurance con-
tract.
3 9
The North Dakota Supreme Court had not formally adopted the
Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations until the Mills decision. How-
ever, a number of North Dakota Supreme Court decisions have in-
terpreted ambiguous terms of insurance policies in a manner im-
plying the court's willingness to adopt the first approach to the doc-
trine.
In Schmitt v. Paramount Fire Insurance Co. 40 the insured's pol-
icy covered water damage resulting from accidental discharge from
within a plumbing system. 41 After a heavy rain, water seeped be-
tween the insured's water piping and the insulation surrounding it
and was converted into steam, thereby causing damage to the in-
sured's basement. 42 The North Dakota Supreme Court stated that
while it is improper to strain the words of an insurance contract
to impose liability on the insurer, language should be construed lib-
erally where it is reasonable to do so.43 The court then construed
the word "within" to include the space between the insulation and
the piping, and held in favor of the insured. 4 4
The North Dakota Supreme Court made a somewhat more di-
rect reference to honoring an insured's reasonable expectations in
Haugen v. Auto Owners Insurance Co. 45 In that case, the insured
installed an oil-burning furnace in a customer's home. While the fur-
nace was being loaded, a pipe installed by the insured separated
and oil ran out into the basement, causing damage.46 When the in-
sured asked his insurer to defend him in the resulting lawsuit, the
insurer refused, stating that the insurance policy excluded the duty
to defend pursuant to a "Products and Completed Operations Haz-
plus Lines Ins. Co., 60 N.J. 375, 290 A.2d 138 (1972), also applied Keeton's definition of
the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations to an umbrella policy and stated that this ap-
proach was proper in determining coverage under policies of this type, even though the
court had declared that the policy was ambiguous and thus could have based its decision
on another approach to the doctrine. Id. at - , 290 A.2d at 140.
.39- See, e.g., Squares, A Skeptical Look at the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations, 6
Fouau 252 (1971) ; Note, Reasonable Expectations: The Insurer's Dilemma, 24 DRAKE L.
REV. 853 (1975).
40. 92 N.W.2d 177 (N.D. 1958).
41. Id. at 178 (emphasis added).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 179.
44. Id. This approach was reapplied recently In Kooker v. Benefit Ass'n of Railway
Employees, 246 N.W.2d 743 (N.D. 1976), which involved coverage for "total disability."
The insured slipped on a boxcar ladder while working and injured his arm. Although the
insured was not completely disabled in a strict sense, he was unable to work at his job.
The insurer denied benefits on the basis of a requirement of "total disability." The court
construed "total disability" in a reasonable or practical manner, Id. at 745, and held in
favor of the insured. Id. at 747.
45. 191 N.W.2d 274 (N.D. 1971).
46. Id. at 276.
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ard Exclusion" contained in an attached endorsement. 47 The su-
preme court stated that "an insurance policy is held to mean what
a reasonable person in the position of the insured would think it
meant. ' ' 4  However, the court went on to state that an insurance
policy must be interpreted as a whole if reasonably practicable. 49
Although the court implied that the policy might have been some-
what unclear, it was not ambiguous, and the judgment for the in-
surer was affirmed.5 0
The North Dakota Supreme Court expressly adopted the Doc-
trine of Reasonable Expectations in Mills v. Agrichemical Aviation,
Inc.2  The court's decision was split, with a majority of the judges
agreeing with a special concurring opinion rather than with the ar-
ticulated opinion of the court.5 2 Both opinions were based upon a find-
ing of ambiguity, although each opinion arrived at the finding of
ambiguity in a different manner.
The articulated opinion of the court found an ambiguity because
the relationship between the two exclusionary clauses was uncertain
and perplexing.5 3 The policy was designed for farm and ranch liabil-
ity.5 4 The court, therefore, felt that the policy would give rise to a
reasonable expectation of coverage for damages caused during the
course of ordinary farming operations, including crop spraying.55
The insured would have been justified in assuming that if the policy
47. Id. at 276-77. The endorsement provided as follows: "It is agreed that the policy
does not apply to the Products Hazard or Completed Operations Hazard as defined there-
in." Id. at 277. "Products Hazard" was defined in the policy as follows:
[It] shall mean goods or products manufactured, sold, handled or dis-
tributed by the named insured or by others trading under his name, in-
eluding reliance upon a representation or warranty made at any time with
respect thereto, but only if the bodily injury Or property damage occurs after
possession of such goods or products has been relinquished to others by the
named insured or by others trading under his name and if such bodily Injury
or property damage occurs away from premises owned, rented or controlled
by the named insured provided, such goods or products sall be deemed to
include any container thereof, other than a vehicle, but shall not include
vending machines or any property, other than such container, rented to or
located for use of others but not sold.
Id.
"Completed Operations Hazard" was defined in the policy as follows:
[It] shall mean operations including reliance upon a representation or
warranty made at any time with respect thereto, but only if the bodily injury
or property damage occurs after such operations have been completed or aban-
doned and occurs away from premises owned by or rented to the named in-
sured. 'Operations' include materials, parts or equipment furnished in con-
nection therewith. Operations shall be deemed completed at the earliest of
the following times:
(1) when all operations to be performed by or on behalf of the named
insured under the contract have been completed,.
Id.
48. Id. at 279.
49. Id. at 280.
50. Id. at 278-80.
51. 250 N.W.2d 663, 673 (N.D. 1977).
52, The opinion of the court was signed by only two justices; Justice Pederson, the
author, and Justice Vogel. Chief Justice Erickstad and Justices Sand and Paulson con-
curred specially.
53. 250 N.V.2d 663, 668 (N.D. 1977). See supra notes 2-3, and text accompanying.
54. Id. See supra note 1, and text accompanying.
55. Id.
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did not cover all his farming operations, any exclusion would have
been called to his attention."6 The opinion of the court seems to have
adopted the second approach to the Doctrine of Reasonable Expec-
tations, requiring an unequivocally conspicuous, plain and clear
exclusion of coverage. The opinion relied heavily on the Steven and
Gray decisions in determining the existence of ambiguity. 57
The special concurring opinion, on the other hand, found ambi-
guity within the wording of the exclusionary clause of the umbrella
policy, and stated that the word "recreational" as used in the phrase
"recreational motor vehicle or aircraft" created an ambiguity. 5 The
specially concurring justices rejected the statement in the opinion of
the court that a farmer might reasonably expect coverage under a
farm and ranch liability policy for damage caused by aerial crop
spraying, even though the policy excluded such coverage, and found
that such a determination should be made by the legislature, not the
court.59 Unlike the opinion of the court, the special concurring opin-
ion would not allow the reasonable expectations of the insured to be
given effect unless there is ambiguity in the specific terms of the
policy. This position seems to be an articulation of the first approach
to the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations.
It should be noted that the lower court in Mills found that the
policy exclusions, when read together with the contract definitions,
were not ambiguous. 60 The lower court relied heavily on C & J Fer-
tilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mutual Insurance Co."l and the third approach
to the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations, stating that even though
there was no ambiguity in the policy, it was reasonable for the in-
sured to expect coverage. 62 Since both opinions of the North Dakota
Supreme Court found an ambiguity in the policy, the reasoning of
the lower court was rejected because it was unnecessary to apply
the third approach to the doctrine.63
After the decision in Mills v. Agrichemical Aviation, Inc., it is
difficult to ascertain the North Dakota Supreme Court's position on
the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations. The court appears to have
rejected the third approach to the doctrine. 64 But, because of the
56. Id.
57. Id. at 672.
58. Id. at 673. (Erickstad, C.J., concurring specially). Justice Erickstaxd stated that
an ordinary person who read the provision "might reasonably be misled to believe that
only recreational activity was excluded from coverage." Id.
59. Id.
60. id. at 667.
61. Id. at 672. The C & J Fertilizer decision is discussed at text accompanying notes
33-38 supra.
62. Id. at 666.
63. Id. at 672 (opinion of the court), and 673 (special concurrence).
64. The propriety of the third approach to the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations In
North Dakota might be seriously questioned because of the language in several state
statutes. For example, N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-07-02 (1975) requires that "[t]he language of
a contract is to govern its interpretation if the language is clear and explicit and does
not involve an absurdity."
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split decision in Mills, it cannot be said with any certainty whether
the first or second approach to the doctrine is the accepted view
in North Dakota. When either of the opinions of the supreme court
is considered in conjunction with prior North Dakota decisions, 65 it
seems that the court is willing to apply the doctrine as an aid in
determining and construing ambiguity. 66
In the future, if the North Dakota Supreme Court applies the
first approach to the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations, as es-
poused by the special concurring opinion in Mills, the doctrine will
have no more effect in North Dakota than the well-established rule
of construing ambiguous language in a policy against the insurer.
However, if the second approach to the doctrine is followed, as ex-
pressed by the opinion of the court, it might prove to have a sig-
nificant effect on the written insurance contract in North Dakota.
CHAD LEDuC
The third approach to the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations allows the reason-
able expectations of the insured to govern, even in the absence of" ambiguity. This ap-
proach seems to be in direct conflict with the statute, because the statute requires clear
and explicit language to govern. See also N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-07-06 (1975). See generaey
N.D. CENT. CODE tit. 26-Insurance (1970), as amended, (Supp. 1975).
65. Kooker v. Benefit Ass'n of Railway Emlployees, 246 N.W.2d 743 (N.D. 1976)
Haugen v. Auto Owners Ins. Co., 191 N.W.2d 274 (N.D. 1971); Schmitt v. Paramount
Fire Ins. Co., 92 N.W.2d 177 (N.D. 1958), discussed at notes 40-50 supra and text ac-
companying.
66. The opinion of the court relied on the logic of Steven v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 58
Cal. 2d 862, 377 P.2d 284, 27 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1963) and Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal.
2d 263, 419 P.2d 168, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1966), decisions which have been criticized for
straining the finding of ambiguity. See supra note 30.

